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CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE CANADIAN FEDERATION*
Mark R. MacGuiganJ
In the never-ending dialogue of tension between man and the 
state the most convenient argument against any encroachment of 
authority on the preserves of the individual is the rallying cry of 
“liberty”, accompanied by the qualifying adjectives “fundamental”, 
“traditional”, or “civil”. A brief look at the contemporary scene 
will provide abundant illustration.
Take, for example, the arguments of those who favour a 
voluntary system of health insurance instead of the universal (or 
in effect compulsory) plan which has been proposed by the federal 
government on the model of the Hall and Saskatchewan plans. 
The most outspoken opponent of the federal proposals, Premier 
Manning of Alberta, said of it in a radio address which is now 
being distributed in the thousands by medical associations:
It is a compulsory program in which participation is com­
pelled by the state and not left to the voluntary choice of the 
citizen himself. This feature of the plan violates a fundamental 
principle of a free society, namely, the right of each citizen to 
exercise freedom of choice in matters relating to his own and his 
family’s welfare.1
There are, of course, other arguments which Premier Manning 
and some members of the medical profession use against the 
federal Medicare proposals— arguments such as the cost to the 
government and the feared lowering of the quality of medical care 
— but in their own view it is the argument based on fundamental 
rights or liberties which is the decisive ohe. I am not here con­
cerned with the rightness or wrongness of the Manning position, 
but only with the status of the argument from civil liberties.
Consider another example, the legislation proposed by Fin­
ance Minister Walter Gordon last spring and passed by the 
Canadian Parliament in June to protect Canadian magazines and 
newspapers from foreign domination.2 This legislation denies
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advertisers the right to deduct as an ordinary expense of business 
for income tax purposes money spent for advertising in publica­
tions that are not owned and directed and published by Canadians, 
or that are held by corporations in which less than 75% of the 
voting stock is owned by Canadians. Further, publications pub­
lished in a foreign country with a special edition aimed at the 
Canadian market, or any publication in which more than 5%  of 
the advertising is directed specifically at the Canadian market will 
be excluded from the country by customs officers. Arguments of 
various kinds were advanced against this legislation. It was 
contended that it would be impossible for the government to 
determine who really controls the holding companies that control 
blocks of shares in Canadian publications and for customs officials 
to decide which foreign publications have too much Canadian 
advertising to be admitted. It was also said that there was serious 
danger of retaliatory measures in the United States and in Great 
Britain. But the key argument against the legislation in every case 
was that it was censorship infringing on the liberty of the press 
and on the right of Canadians to read what they choose. An 
article in the Winnipeg Free Press in June compared Mr. Gordon 
to King George III (“He taxed advertising” ), Adolf Hitler (“He 
jailed editors”), Josef Stalin (“He made the press a Government 
mouthpiece” ), and Fidel Castro (“He exiled editors”).3 Censor­
ship of advertising, it was maintained, is the same as censorship 
of editorial and news matter, for it interferes with the right of 
people to inform themselves (of what products exist so that they 
may decide for themselves how to spend their money). In brief 
the legislation was held to interfere with the citizen’s right to know 
and the newspaper’s right to publish.
Two further examples may be borrowed from the United 
States. Along with some of his greater concerns President Johnson 
is this winter attempting to have Congress repeal section 14(b) of 
the Taft-Hartley Act, which allows states to pass “right-to-work” 
laws. (Nineteen states have passed such laws outlawing the union 
shop, which as you know compels all employees, not to belong to a 
union, but to pay union dues.) Senator Dirksen, opposing the 
repeal of the section, and much of the U.S. press regard this as a 
great civil liberties issue, viz. the right of people to work “without 
paying tribute” to unions, and the right of the states to give them 
that protection.
The other American instance to which I would draw your 
attention is the famous— or infamous— Proposition 14, the amend­
3 “Press Control Has a Long History", Winnipeg Free Press, June 19, 
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ment to the constitution of California which was approved by the 
voters of that state in the 1964 election. The amendment reads 
as follows:
Neither the state nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall 
deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any 
person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or 
all of his real property to such person or persons as he, in his 
absolute discretion, chooses.
The operative concept in this amendment is the so-called “freedom 
to sell”. The analogous concept “the freedom to do business” has 
frequently been used to defeat open-housing legislation in various 
parts of the United States, and arguments over these measures have 
raged principally around the abstract question of fundamental 
freedom.
When so much emphasis is placed in current controversy on 
civil libertarian arguments, it is obvious that the dry question of 
classification of liberties into those which are genuinely classed as 
such and those which are not is of considerable importance, if only 
to dispel attendant myths and emotions. The four examples I 
have presented are instances in which I do not believe genuine 
civil libertarian values are being defended. Let me try to explain 
why I take this position.
One of the most widely accepted classifications of civil 
liberties in Canada is that of Professor (now Mr. Justice) Laskin, 
who proposed a fourfold division into political, legal, egalitarian, 
and economic liberties.4 Political civil liberty is associated with 
the operation of parliament in a democratic state and comprises 
freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of speech, freedom of 
assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of the press and of 
dissemination of ideas generally. Legal civil liberty concerns the 
justice of the legal order, and includes freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, and from arbitrary search and seizure of person, premises and 
papers, the protection of impartial adjudication, involving notice 
and fair hearing, an independent judiciary and the right to counsel, 
and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Egali­
tarian civil liberty has to do with human rights, and embraces 
access to public places and to employment without discrimination 
based on colour, creed or ethnic origin. Finally, economic civil 
liberty protects economic rights from undue state regulation and 
intervention. The alternate formulation by Dean Frank Scott5 
would supplement the last group of economic liberties by the addi­
4 “An Inquiry into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights” (1959), 37 Can. 
Bar Rev. 77, at pp. 80-82.
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tion of cultural rights, and would add a distinct class of minority 
rights, which, as he points out, “rank ahead of nearly all other 
rights in the minds of most people in Quebec.”6
With all due respect to these two great civil libertarians, I 
would disagree with both of them, taking the position that they 
have cast their nets too wide. I would eliminate economic, cultural, 
and minority rights from their classifications and retain only 
political, legal and egalitarian civil liberties.
In my opinion the concept “civil liberties” should be reserved 
for those liberties which (1) are wholly negative in their scope and
(2) relate directly to the human person. This position introduces 
the two concepts of “negative” and personal”.
We usually think of ourselves as being free to the extent that 
no one interferes with our activity, to the extent that we can do 
what we want. This is a negative, laissez-faire, let-me-alone kind 
of freedom. Negative freedom is therefore the power to do what 
you want, the freedom not to be coerced or constrained by others. 
It is potential freedom, freedom from (freedom from interference), 
freedom of choice. It is contrasted with what we may call positive 
freedom, the liberty not just to avoid being pushed around by 
outside forces but actually to control those forces, to be maitres 
chez nous, as our Quebec friends have it. In individual terms 
positive freedom will mean the determination to be masters of 
ourselves; in social terms it will mean the determination to possess 
the social and economic means to achieve what we want to do. 
Negative freedom is the jungle impulse of everyone-for-himself; 
postive freedom is the civilizing impulse of let’s-do-it together.
It is obvious from my description that I regard positive 
freedom as in many respects superior to negative freedom; indeed 
we may say, philosophically speaking, that it is the end or reason 
for which negative freedom exists, or that it is related to it as the 
actual to the potential. Yet it is negative and not positive freedom 
that I am positing as a measure of the proper sphere of civil liberties. 
I shall explore the reason for this in a moment. But the area of 
civil liberties cannot simply be identical with negative freedom or 
there would be no authority and no law at all, for every law is an 
infringement of negative freedom. It is therefore only those nega­
tive freedoms which relate to the person which constitute civil 
liberties— those liberties which in the Laskin classification are 
designated as political, legal, and egalitarian. Thus in the concept 
properly understood we see the coalescence of the two require­
ments of “negative” and “personal”.
6 Ibid., at p. 29.
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Now it may appear that these criteria have been chosen 
arbitrarily and that other criteria would do just as well. It must 
be admitted that there is an important element of selection and 
choice in the decision as to what liberties shall be classified as 
“civil”. A dictionary is of little help in such a technical matter as 
this, and in any case I take it that the issue is more than just a 
question of semantics. What it is that we essentially have to decide 
is which liberties must be given pride of place; which liberties, in 
other words, are the most fundamental for democracy? Those 
which we decide are the more essential will be called “civil liber­
ties”, those which are less essential or merely beneficial will be 
described otherwise.
The proposition that democracy demands a limited govern­
ment, one restrained by a deep respect for the civil liberties of 
individuals and minorities, is so manifest as to be in little need of 
defence. A wise philosopher of democracy, Sir Ernest Barker, has 
put it this way:
[Democracy rests on . . . discussion—discussion of compet­
ing ideas, leading to a compromise in which all the ideas are 
reconciled and which can be accepted by all because it bears the 
imprint of all.7
The acceptance of these axioms is an inherent condition of 
any system of government by discussion. . . .
The first of the axioms which have to be accepted we may 
call by the name of Agreement to Differ.
The second of the axioms on which democracy proceeds is 
that of the Majority Principle.
There is a third axiom . . . This is the principle of Com­
promise. The will of a majority does not prevail when it is 
merely the formal will of a mathematical majority. It prevails 
when it has been attained in a spirit, and when it has thus 
attained a content or substance, which does justice to the whole 
of the community and satisfies its general and universal character.8
Democracy is not to be simply identified with the rule of the 
majority; but, if it is to be differentiated from tyranny, it must be 
characterized by a protectiveness towards dissenting individuals 
and groups.
Presumably we can all agree on this starting point. But the 
difficult question is which liberties of dissenters should be given a 
privileged status and how should this special status be justified? 
On the question of rational justification disagreement is to be 
expected, since the shape of the ratiocination depends on the
7 Reflections on Government (Oxford, 1942), at p. 36.
8 Ibid., at pp. 63-68.
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ideology of the ratiocinator, and many different ideological 
approaches to democracy are perenially present. My own prefer­
ence would be for an argument based on the existential fact of 
man as a person, endowed with inalienable freedoms, rights and 
duties which flow directly from a nature characterized by intelli­
gence and the faculty of free choice.
But perhaps if we cannot all agree on the causes, we can at least 
agree on the effects. The opening statement of American Declara­
tion of Independence in 1776 asserts the existence of certain self- 
evident truths—“that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed . . . with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. Similarly the French 
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen” of 1789 speaks 
of “the natural, inalienable and sacred Rights of Man”. Such 
rights are by common consent freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of assembly 
and of petition, freedom of association, freedom from arbitrary 
interference with one’s person, freedom from discrimination. It is 
possible to go on, to list other prized powers, the right to property, 
the right to free initiative in economic affairs, the right to work, 
the right to education, the right to culture, but the difference 
between the two groups is indicated by the fact that this latter 
group is more correctly given the name of rights rather than that 
of freedoms or liberties. The former group is composed of free­
doms that are not only personal but also negative. The latter 
group is composed of freedoms that are either not personal but 
involve the possession of property or, if personal, are not negative, 
and require, not the removing of a barrier by the State but the 
providing of a service.
It is possible to defend the preferred status of the first group 
of freedoms from many viewpoints. To the extent that the priority 
reflects a distinction between spiritual goods and material ones it 
can be argued that spiritual goods appeal to man at his most truly 
human level, at the level at which he rises above the other beings 
in the universe. It can be argued that governmental control is more 
directly necessary with respect to material goods and that the 
“hands-off” status of non-material goods is thereby assured: for 
material goods like coal and lumber (or whatever form of property 
you care to enumerate, even so-called intangible personal prop­
erty) are limited in amount, are not capable of satisfying to the 
fullest imaginable extent the present wants of the three billion 
people on the planet, and are limited in total reserves. Hence we 
heed rules of behaviour such as the laws of contract, of property,
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of labour, and of monopoly to regulate production, exchange and 
consumption. This is precisely the area in which law is most neces­
sary; it is an area not of liberty, but of regulation.
Moreover, quite apart from the distinctive exigencies of 
materiality, the first group of freedoms have a prior relationship 
of necessity to the democratic process itself. Thus, in the Alberta 
Press case Duff C.J.C. was moved to comment: “There can be no 
controversy that such institutions [a parliament working under the 
influence of public opinion and public discussion] derive their effi­
cacy from the free public discussion of affairs, from criticism and 
answer and counter-criticism, from attack upon policy and admin­
istration and defence and counter-attack; from the freest and fullest 
analysis and examination from every point of view of political pro­
posals.”9 And Cannon J. in the same case added: “Freedom of 
discussion is essential to enlighten public opinion in a democratic 
State; it cannot be curtailed without affecting the right of the people 
to be informed through sources independent of the government 
concerning matters of public interest. There must be an untram­
melled publication of the news and political opinions of the politi­
cal parties contending for ascendancy. . . . Democracy cannot be 
maintained without its foundation: free public opinion and free 
discussion throughout the nation of all matters affecting the State 
within the limits set by the criminal code and the common law.”10 
And our greatest judicial civil libertarian, a native son of this 
province, Rand J. declared in the Boucher case: “Freedom in 
thought and speech and disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on every 
conceivable subject, are of the essence of our life.”11 My examples 
have illustrated the fundamental necessity of the so-called political 
freedoms rather than the others, but in the Saumur case Rand J. 
placed the political and the legal rights of the person on the same 
level: “[F]reedom of speech, religion and the inviolability of the 
person, are original freedoms which are at once the necessary attri­
butes and modes of self-expression of human beings and the pri­
mary conditions of their community life within a legal order.”12 I 
must concede that the egalitarian freedoms, essentially the free­
dom not to be discriminated against, are on a slightly lower level, 
though still deserving of the preferred status of civil liberties: for 
as the United States Supreme Court recognized in the famous 
desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education,18 discrimination
9 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938) S.C.R. 100 at p. 133.
10 Ibid., at pp. 145-146.
11 Boucher v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at p. 288.
12 Saumur v. Quebec and A.-G. Que., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at p. 329.
13 (1954), 347 U.S. 483.
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based on natural facts like race and language or on fundamental 
personal choices like religion can destroy psychologically the very 
soul of a man, as well as demean the psyche of the perpetrator.
In summary, then, it is in my view crucial to distinguish 
between civil liberties and economic and social policies, for other­
wise we shall make the realm of civil liberties co-extensive with the 
whole of the law, and so frustrate the fundamental purpose of con­
ceptualizing and distinguishing civil liberties. The domain of civil 
liberties is a limited one, but of the first importance for the law, 
because it is the area of the most cherished, the most “sacred”, 
values, ahd its criteria are the two attributes of negative liberty 
and personal liberty.
Instances of infringement of civil liberties as thus defined 
come readily to mind. The Alberta Press Bill which required news­
papers in that province to publish official statements about govern­
ment policy and to make full disclosure of all sources of informa­
tion for any other statement published, both under penalty of total 
prohibition of publication, was incompatible with political liberties 
even though it did not directly attempt to prevent discussion of 
public affairs in the press, and it was so found by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in 1938.14 Similarly the Quebec “Padlock Law” 
which allowed the Attorney General of the Province to close any 
building used for the propagation of Communism or bolshevism 
was justly struck down in 1957.“
With regard to legal freedoms, we can turn for illustration of 
potential interference to the abortive Ontario Bill 99 of 1964, the 
infamous Police Bill.10 This Bill might have made it possible for 
a man to be pulled in off the streets by the police, brought before 
the Police Commission in secrecy, and in the event of refusal to 
answer the questions put by the Commission, to be thrown into 
jail indefinitely for eight-day stretches, and to be forbidden by law 
to communicate with anyone, even his own counsel. This is not the 
place to indulge in psycho-analysis of the proposers of the Bill, but 
whatever the reasons for its introduction it was speedily withdrawn 
in the face of outraged cries from the legislative opposition and the 
press.
For an example of racial discrimination we need look no 
farther than the neighbouring province of Nova Scotia, where some 
12,000 Negroes, the largest coloured population in Canada, live.
14 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100.
15 Switzman v. Elbling and Attorney-General of Quebec, [1957] S.C.R.
285.
16 Sec MacGuigan, “Press, not Lawyers, Saved Liberty,” The Com­
mentator, July-August 1964, p. 12.
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In a brief presented last December 9 to the Federal-Provincial 
Conference on poverty the Nova Scotia Association for the Advance­
ment of Coloured People maintained that racial prejudice and dis­
crimination are at least partly to blame for the poverty of the Negro 
community in the province.17 The brief proposed four projects 
providing new facilities for education, counselling, and health and 
welfare. On the view I take of civil liberties such proposals do not 
come within the domain of civil liberties but rather within the 
area of general socal policy. Nevertheless, erosions of egalitarian 
freedoms illustrate that positive legislation (e.g., a postive legisla­
tive act to forbid racial discrimination) may sometimes be neces­
sary even to guarantee essentially negative rights. Indeed there 
has for some time been a Human Rights Act in Nova Scotia which 
provides for a fine of up to $500 for refusal to accommodate or serve 
anyone by reason of race or colour.18 Such legislation is not only 
praiseworthy but a genuine protection of an important civil liberty; 
the only criticism of it has been with respect to its enforcement, 
which has been said to be so lax that Negroes have been dis­
couraged even from complaining against offenders.
The “privileged position” view of civil liberties refutes the 
libertarian status of the arguments in the two Canadian and two 
American examples with which I began, for these arguments rest 
on the recognition of economic liberties as fundamental human 
liberties. As Finance Minister Gordon put it in the debate on his 
newspaper legislation: “The proposal interferes with one freedom 
and one freedom only. It means that a Canadian publisher wanting 
to sell his newspaper will have to accept the best bid he can get 
from other Canadians. . . .”19 In my view this freedom is not a 
basic human right.
I want, however, to make it clear that I am not arguing that 
the Hon. Mr. Gordon’s legislation is beyond question; indeed the 
cogency of many of the arguments against it is very great. I am 
confining myself to the question of the grounds on which the 
attack may be made, and am arguing only that an attack from a 
civil liberties viewpoint is a mistaken one. The encounter must 
be fought out on a social and political battleground, not on a 
libertarian one.
I should add that I do not take the simplistic view that the 
mere categorizing of a liberty as civil puts an end to all problems. 
There may well be conflicts, for example, between two validly
17 Toronto Globe & Mail, December 10, 1965, p. 10.
18 (1963), 12 Eliz. II, c. 5, s. 16 (N .S.).
19 Debates, House of Commons, Canada, June 14, 1965, p. 2387.
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recognized civil liberties. The most subtle point of contention 
between the litigants in recent American school prayer cases has 
been two versions of freedom of religion: on the one hand, it has 
been argued that the free religious exercise of the minority is 
interfered with by school prayer, and on the other hand it has 
been contended that the majority’s freedom of religion is infringed 
by forbidding school prayer. Such conflicts are unavoidable, and 
I avoid them here only because they are a side issue to my main 
theme.
* * * * * *
Now this has perhaps seemed like an overlong prologue to the 
main subject of my address, “Civil Liberties in the Canadian 
Federation”, but on reflection I hope it will appear that we have 
been discussing the main subject all along. For if “civil liberties” 
is a narrowly defined concept and a highly preferred domain of 
values, the stage is certainly set for a particular view of civil 
liberties in a federal state. I should probably call this view a 
“national” one if it were not for the double meaning of that word 
which has caused so much misunderstanding in recent constitu­
tional discourse. The word “federal” is another that might be 
used to describe the point of view I have taken, but it too is subject 
to certain differences of interpretation, depending on whether it is 
being used as the contrary of “provincial” or as the opposite of 
“unitary”. Besides, I want to stress the relationship of civil liberties 
not so much to government, be it provincial or federal, as to the 
basic human inteiests of the Canadian people themselves, wherever 
they may be. I therefore propose to describe this approach as 
pan-Canadiah.
The pan-Canadian view is necessitated by the conceptualiza­
tion I have developed for civil liberties. If civil liberties means the 
reflective and communicative liberties of the citizen which are 
necessary for the preservation of the democratic system, then it 
is not something which can be permitted to flourish only inter- 
stitially in our country, or to exist in nine provinces while being 
curtailed in the tenth. If civil liberties includes the freedom of the 
subject from arbitrary arrest and detention, we cannot believe that 
we are really free from oppressive authoritarianism while anywhere 
in the land men remain unjustly in custody. If civil liberties 
embraces the freedom from discrimination, we cannot rest while 
fellow men in any province continue to be subject to slings, arrows, 
outrages, and misfortunes.
You will recall that I was careful to exclude minority rights 
as a distinct class from my conception of civil liberties— that is,
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minority rights in the sense of language or education rights, though 
they might indeed be included in another way, at least to the extent 
that they were threatened with legal extinction. There is therefore 
nothing in the concept of civil liberties which might be of exclusive 
concern to the government or people of only one province. There 
is nothing provincial about civil liberties; they are pan-Canadiaii 
in every sense. In my view there can be no leeway here for the 
expression of regional morality or for regional social experimenta­
tion which might cut into civil liberties. In general such regionalism 
is a healthy consequence of federalism, but civil liberties are too 
vital for trenching to be desirable in the event of conflict.
Now I have, of course, been talking about the ideal, without 
reference to the Canadian Constitution, which may prove to be a 
stumbling block to a pan-Canadian view of civil liberties. The 
first thing to observe, I believe, in turning to the Constitution is 
the generality of its language and the immensity of the judicial 
discretion. One need not go so far as the celebrated Bishop 
Hoadly (“Nay, whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret 
any written or spoken laws, it is He who is truly the Law Giver 
to all intents and purposes, and not the Person who first wrote and 
spoke them” )20 to recognize the generous area of judicial choice 
in the constitutional field, where the text is too general to be of 
significant help and recourse to legislative intention is forbidden.
In his little book on civil liberties Dean Scott describes the 
two ways in which, as a result of this wide judicial discretion, 
judges may in their interpretations lean to the side of liberty:
First, there is the established rule that all statutes should be 
strictly interpreted if they limit or reduce the rights of the citizen. 
Parliament must always be presumed to have intended the least 
interference with our freedom, not the most. Hence if two views 
of what a statute means are possible, that one will be preferred 
which leaves the larger area to the individual. . . .
Secondly, the courts must say of any challenged statute 
whether or not it is within the powers of the enacting legislature.
This judgment is a very complicated and difficult one, requiring 
a nice balance of legal skill, respect for established rules, and 
plain common sense. Law and statesmanship are inextricably 
intermingled in the interpretation of constitutions.21
With this advice in mind, let us look to the British North America 
Act to see where jurisdiction over civil liberties might come.
20 See MacGuigan, Jurisprudence: Readings and Cases (Toronto, 1966), 
p. 162.
21 Civil Liberties and Canadian Federalism (Toronto. 1959). p. 26.
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The principal provincial power under which jurisdiction over 
civil liberties could be claimed is the power to legislate in relation 
to “property and civil rights in the province”. The term “civil 
rights” is, of course, used interchangeably in the United States with 
the term “civil liberties”, but that is hot in itself a warrant for 
treating the phrases as synonyms in Canada. The phrase “prop­
erty and civil rights” was not used for the first time in the British 
North America Act, but appeared first a century earlier in the 
Quebec Act, where it seems clearly to have been governed by the 
word “property”, and at most to extend property rights to include 
all private laws, i.e., laws relating to dealings between subjects 
rather than between subject ahd state. Generally speaking, the 
broadest interpretation the courts have given the phrase is the 
regulation of economic activity within the province.22
The federal heads of power under which civil liberties juris­
diction might be supported are either the federal residual power 
(over matters not specifically assigned to any government) or 
under the criminal law power, or both. However, in order to 
discuss the problem of constitutional jurisdiction more precisely 
it would be necessary to examine in some detail the question of 
jurisdiction with respect to each group of civil liberties. I propose 
to do this only in summary form. The civil liberties cases I have 
already referred to had to do with political liberties, and here the 
consensus of students of the Supreme Court is that jurisdiction over 
this area has been implicitly assigned to the federal power, though 
a majority of the court has never so declared in explicit terms.
Thus, federal jurisdiction was asserted by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in the Alberta Press case.23 Similarly, the court, in 
striking down a Quebec statute which allowed municipalities to 
require stores to close on Catholic holy days in the Birks case,24 
laid down a rule that laws affecting religious observance belong 
exclusively within the field of criminal law. Again, in the Padlock 
Law case25 the court held that the subject matter of that law came 
within the criminal law power. Such cases seem to establish 
indirectly that jurisdiction over political liberties is an aspect of 
the power of the federal Parliament over criminal law.
The possibility is still also open that authority to infringe on 
fundamental liberties is denied to both federal and provincial 
parliaments. The Quebec Court of Appeal has rested the right of
22 See Schmeiser, Civil Liberties in Canada (Toronto, 1964), pp. 75-78.
23 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100.
24 Henry Birks & Sons v. Montreal, [1955] S.C.R. 799.
25 Switzman v. Elbling and Attorney-General of Quebec, [1957] S.C.R.
285.
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a Witness of Jehovah to have his children exempted from Catholic 
religious instruction in school on a natural-law principle of religious 
freedom,28 and there have also been dicta by Supreme Court judges 
in a number of cases, most notably by Mr. Justice Abbott in the 
Switzman case,27 which might go to support this approach. More 
likely, however, such a total exclusion of all legislatures from civil 
liberties would be based upon a kind of common-law natural law, 
which would find its justification in the words in the preamble erf 
the B.N.A. Act stipulating a constitution similar in principle to the 
British: using these words as a principle of interpretation, a court 
would be free to find that the concept of “parliament” implies free 
speech, a free press, etc. Such an approach finds judicial support 
at the highest level in the 1938 judgments erf Chief Justice Duff28 
and Mr. Justice Cannon29 in the Alberta Press case, where the 
court held ultra vires Alberta legislation interfering with the 
freedom of the press.
With respect to legal liberties, there is a certain priority in 
the federal Parliament in the light of the federal power over 
criminal law, including procedure in criminal matters. Obviously, 
however, there must also be power in the provinces to legislate 
in this area, or there could be no administration and enforcement 
of provincial laws: it may be said that in a certain sense, despite 
the Constitution, the criminal law power is a concurrent federal 
and provincial power. In the case of conflict federal law will 
prevail, but, barring that eventuality there will be room for the 
operation of provincial jurisdiction as well. Egalitarian liberties 
have generally been thought erf as under provincial control, and 
almost all the existing legislation in this area is provincial, but 
there can be little doubt that the federal Parliament could decide 
to legislate against racial or religious discrimination under the 
federal criminal law power, and that this legislation would then 
have paramountcy over any provincial legislation. Laskin points 
out that a criminal law approach to this problem “would be on 
a par with the approach reflected in section 367 of the Criminal 
Code, dealing with discrimination in employment on account of 
union activity”.80 Provincial legislation in this area, then, depends 
on the absence of federal legislation, and of course the provinces
26 Chabot v. School Commissioners of Lamorandiere (1957), 12 D.L.R. 
(2d) 796.
27 [1957] S.C.R. 285, at p. 328.
28 [1938] S.C.R. 100, at pp. 132-135.
29 Ibid., at pp. 142-147.
30 “An Inquiry into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights” (1959), 37 Can. 
Bar Rev. 77, 106.
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can also go further than the federal Parliament (though in that 
case no longer acting within the realm of civil liberties as I have 
defined it) in providing educational and employment opportunities 
for minorities. If this outline of constitutional jurisdiction can be 
defended in detail (as I have ho doubt that it can), then sub­
stantially the whole area of civil liberties as I have defined it is 
under federal jurisdiction, so that there is no difference between 
what is ideologically desirable and what is constitutionally possible. 
The irresistible conclusion, of course, is the need for a bold new 
federal initiative in the field of civil liberties.
I have left to the last the question of a Bill of Rights, since 
this is the logical place for federal initiative to focus. We have 
had a Bill of Rights since I960,81 but it is timid in conception and 
has been largely ignored by the courts in practice. The Bill recog­
nizes and declares a number of freedoms which “have existed and 
shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, 
national origin, colour, religion or sex”,32 and the courts are 
ordered to construe and apply every federal statute so as not to 
abrogate, abridge or infringe any of the rights recognized, unless 
Parliament expressly declares to the contrary.*3 As I suggested, 
it has already been reduced to impotence by judicial interpretation, 
primarily because of the unwillingness of the courts to consider 
it as a piece of fundamental law to which all other statutes are 
to be conformed— and considering the fact that it is merely an 
ordinary statute of the Parliament of Canada and in no way 
entrenched, there is something to be said for this judicial attitude. 
The most ingenious bit of judicial nullification of the broader 
purposes of the statute takes as its point of departure the state­
ment that the enumerated freedoms “have existed and shall con­
tinue to exist”.34 That language means, the courts have held, that 
these freedoms shall continue to exist in the future in the same 
way in which they have existed in the past; that is, the Bill of 
Rights has made no change in the existing law, and all rights 
continue to exist in the same attenuated way as before.
But in the light erf the general federal jurisdiction over civil 
liberties the most serious question to be raised about the present 
Bill of Rights is its self-imposed limitation in the main body erf 
the Bill to Acts of the Parliament of Canada and orders, rules, or 
regulations thereunder,38 thereby excluding from its purview any
31 (I960 ), 8-9 Eliz. II, c. 44 (Can.).
32 Ibid., s. 1.
33 Ibid., s. 2.
34 Ibid., s. 1.
35 Ibid., s. 5(2).
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acts hostile to civil liberties which may happen to emanate from 
a provincial legislature. This timidity is only partially redeemed 
by the fact that the fundamental freedoms enumerated in the Bill 
are not so restricted, but that jurisdiction to all “matters coming 
within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada”,36 but 
this is merely a declaratory section of the Bill with no provision 
for striking down offensive legislation. The drafters of the Bill 
were timid beyond constitutional necessity and beyond the require­
ments erf sound policy. Where full exercise of constitutional power 
was needed, under-use of existing power was the order of the day.
Now, six years later, the need for a strong federal Bill of 
Rights is even greater, for in the interval we have witnessed the 
Quiet Revolution in Quebec with its strong—and sometimes 
strident— assertion of provincial powers, we have watched the 
flexing of muscles by a number of provincial premiers, and we 
have seen the appointment of the McRuer Commission of Inquiry 
into Civil Rights in Ontario. What area could be more ready for 
federal initiative than one in which the federal Parliament possesses 
unused powers, what area could be more appropriate for a federal 
showing of strength than one which is intrinsically related to the 
survival of democracy itself, what area could be more symbolic of 
the fundamental unity of Canadians than one which reflects their 
common dedication to the rights of man?
What most civil libertarians would like to see is a constitu­
tionally entrenched Bill of Rights which could not be amended 
or abrogated except by extraordinary means and which because 
of its exceptional constitutional position would be taken at face 
value by the courts. Such an entrenched Bill would permanently 
prevent derogations from civil liberties by either federal or pro­
vincial authorities. However, if this is not attainable in the present 
impasse over constitutional repatriation and amendment, the next 
best thing would be a federal Bill of Rights which would proclaim 
the pan-Canadian character of civil liberties. The passage of an 
adequate, effective, and eloquent Bill of Rights by the Canadian 
Parliament would in my opinion be the most fitting gift which 
the people of Canada, through their representatives, could give to 
themselves for their one-hundredth birthday celebration.
36 Ibid., s. 5 (3 ).
